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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The present action asks this Court to confirm that a signatory to an arbitration agreement 
cannot compel non-signatories to arbitrate disputes against their will unless there is a basis under 
ordinary principles of agency or contract law for doing so. Appellant Mark Boling ("Boling") 
filed a demand for arbitration against Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC, an entity with whom 
he had an agreement containing an arbitration clause. Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC is not 
a party to the present litigation because it is a party to the agreement containing the arbitration 
clause. In his demand for arbitration, however, Boling also named all counter-defenda..11ts, none 
of whom are parties to the agreement between Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC and Boling. 
While any of the counter-defendants could have voluntarily consented to join in the 
arbitration, each of them elected to exercise their right to defend themselves in a traditional 
judicial forum. None of them have ever undertaken any actions that would constitute a waiver of 
that right and Boling cannot establish, under ordinary principals of agency or contract law, that 
they should be compelled to arbitration against their will. Because the non-signatories have the 
right to litigate Boling' s claims against them in the judicial forum, the district court correctly 
stayed the arbitration. The counter-defendants respectfully request that this Court affirm the 
district court's order. 
B. Concise Statement of the Factual and Procedural History 
The facts relevant to the present appeal are largely undisputed. Boling entered into a 
subscription agreement with Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC. R. 000009-000015. The 
subscription agreement contained an arbitration clause. R. 000012. The subscription agreement 
was signed by Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC, by and through its manager, Clearwater 
REI, LLC, by and through its manager, Barton Cole Cochran. R. 000014. The Subscription 
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Agreement incorporated by reference a Private Placement Memorandum (the "PPM"). 
R. 000010. The PPM fully disclosed to Boling the nature of the investment Boling was 
making in Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC, as well as the nature of the relationship between 
Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC and each counter-defendant (other than Rob Ruebel, who is 
not mentioned in the PPM). See, e.g. R. 000086-89. The only connection between counter-
defendant Rob Ruebel and Boling that appears in the record is that Mr. Ruebel's contact 
information is included on a cover letter enclosing information related to the Clearwater 2008 
Note Program, LLC that was sent to Boling. R. 000123. 
On or about February 15, 2012, Boling filed a demand for arbitration against Clearwater 
2008 Note Program, LLC and the counter-defendants. R. 000017-19. The counter-defendants 
objected to the demand for arbitration and filed a petition to stay arbitration as to them, on the 
grounds that they were non-signatories to the arbitration agreement. R. 00005-00020. In 
response to the petition to stay arbitration, Boling filed an answer (R. 000022-000025) and, 
under separate pleading, filed substantive counterclaims against the counter-defendants alleging 
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (R. 000026-000223 ). Counter-defendants 
moved to dismiss Boling's substantive counterclaims on the grounds they were improperly filed 
in response to a petition to stay arbitration. Boling strenuously urged the district court to allow 
him to keep his counterclaims in place, representing in writing three times in his opposition to 
the motion to stay arbitration that he would agree to the stay if he were allowed to pursue his 
counterclaims: 
However, had Boling attempted to compel arbitration with the 
courts, which he does not intend to do if the Court allows Boling's 
counterclaims to be prosecuted in this lawsuit, Boling would have 
prevailed and plaintiffs would not be entitled to their costs and 
possible attorney fees herein. 
R. 000252-253 (Opposition to Motion to Stay Arbitration at 16-17) (emphasis original). 
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If the Court allows Boling' s counterclaims to be prosecuted in this 
lawsuit, which all Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have been served 
with the counterclaims and discovery is pending, then Defendant 
Boling accept~ Plaintiffs' objection to arbitrate and decision not to 
arbitrate claims against Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. Judicial 
intervention in this lawsuit is Boling' s preferred method to resolve 
his ICPA claims because 1) it allows Boling the right to judicial 
discovery of information exclusively in Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants' possession, which is denied by arbitration, 2) none of 
the proposed arbitrators have any experience in handling unique 
ICP A claims or issues, and 3) for judicial economy, the 
prosecution of the counterclaims is significantly advance at this 
time. 
R. 000253 (Opposition to Motion to Stay Arbitration at 17, n.3) (emphasis original). 
Additionally, if the Couit allows Boling's counterclaims to be 
prosecuted in this lawsuit, which all Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
have been served with the counterclaims and discovery is pending, 
Boling, as the prevailing party, accepts Plaintiffs' objection to 
arbitrate and decision not to arbitrate claims against 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. 
R. 000260 (Opposition to Motion to Stay Arbitration at 24) (emphasis original). The district 
court granted the motion to stay arbitration and found that it had jurisdiction to allow Boling's 
substantive counterclaims be prosecuted in that action. R. 000278-79. Counter-defendants 
answered Boling's counterclaims. R. 000280-94. After having repeatedly advising the district 
court that he would not seek arbitration if he were allowed to maintain his substantive 
counterclaims, Boling changed his position and moved to compel the counter-defendants to 
arbitration. R. 000507-540. After full briefing and hearing on the motion, the district court 
denied Boling's motion to compel, stayed arbitration as to the counter-defendants, and certified 
the decision as a final judgment. R. 000575-576. Boling timely appealed. R. 000578. 
II. RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
l. Under Idaho contract law, can a counter-defendant who is not a signatory to the 
agreement containing the arbitration clause and who is not seeking any direct benefits 
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arising from the agreement containing the arbitration clause be compelled to arbitrate a 
dispute against his will? 
2. Under Idaho law of judicial estoppel, does a party waive his right to compel arbitration 
when he represents to a court that he will not oppose a petition to stay arbitration if the 
court allows him to pursue substantive counterclaims and the court grants to him the 
requested relief? 
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Counter-defendants seek attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly denied Boling's motion to compel arbitration against the 
counter-defendants and this Court should affirm that decision. The district court's decision was 
correct because none of the counter-defendants signed the agreement containing the arbitration 
provision and Boling failed to establish any theory under Idaho agency or contract law whereby 
that agreement can be enforced against any of the counter-defendants. 
Moreover, Boling expressly waived his right to seek an order compelling arbitration. By 
informing the district court that he would not oppose the motion to stay if he was allowed to 
pursue his substantive claims as counterclaims to the petition to stay arbitration. Thereafter, 
Boling engaged in discovery substantially invoking the litigation machinery. After undertaking 
these actions and gaining advantages which Boling admits would not have been available to him 
in the arbitration context, Boling then changed course and sought an order compelling 
arbitration. Boling should be judicially estopped from taking a position different than that which 
he initially took in the litigation. And, because Boling has changed cours~ without a good faith 
basis for doing so, Boling should be made to pay the counter-defendants' legal fees for pursuing 
this frivolous appeal. 
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A. Boling cannot compel the non-signatory counter-defendants to arbitration. 
By this appeal, Boling seeks an order compelling the non-signatory counter-defendants to 
defend in arbitration claims that Boling has brought against them. Boling's demand to compel 
these non-signatories into arbitration invokes the first portion of a two part test used to determine 
whether a matter can be submitted to arbitration. Because Boling cannot satisfy the threshold of 
this two part test, an order compelling arbitration would be improper. 
When deciding a motion to compel or stay arbitration, a court must address two 
questions: first, whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement and, if so, 
whether the dispute at issue is subject to that arbitration agreement. Mason v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 200, 177 P.3d 944, 947 n.1 (2007) (citing First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)). Both portions of this test are questions of law 
which are to be resolved by a court under state law contract principles. Id. 
[C]ourts should order arbitration of a dispute only where the court 
is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties' arbitration 
agreement nor its enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in 
issue. Where a party contests either or both matters, 'the court' 
must resolve the disagreement. 
Granite Rock Co. v. Int'! Bd Of Teamsters, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 2857-58 (2010). Arbitration 
agreements are to be on the same footing as other contracts, but not more so. EEOC v. Waffl.e 
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293-94 (2002). In this matter, it is undisputed that none of the 
counter-defendants are parties to the agreement containing the arbitration clause. Because they 
are not parties to that agreement, the arbitration clause contained within that agreement cannot be 
enforced against them unless Boling establishes some other theory under ordinary principles of 
state agency or contract law where the agreement could be enforced against them. 
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Where a party seeks to enforce an arbitration provision against a person who is not a 
party to the contract containing the arbitration provision, the enforcing party must establish that 
some principle of state agency or contract law would otherwise allow the contract to be enforced 
against that non-signatory. Arthur Anderson v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631-32 (2009) 
(abrogating any authority suggesting that there is a body of federal substantive law of arbitration 
that governs whether non-parties can be compelled to arbitrate and making it clear that the issue 
is to be resolved by state contract law). "'Traditional principles' of state law allow a contract to 
be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract through 'assumption, piercing the corporate 
veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories, waiver and 
estoppel.. .. "' Id. at 631. 
Boling appears to acknowledge that, in order for any of the counter-defendants to be 
compelled into arbitration, he must establish some theory under ordinary principles of agency or 
contract law that would allow Boling to enforce the agreement against that particular person or 
entity. Boling asks this Court to enforce the arbitration agreement on one of three separate 
theories: agency, third-party beneficiary, and an "inextricably intertwined" version of estoppel. 
App. Br. 28-29. However, under Idaho law and the facts of this case, none of these theories give 
Boling the right to enforce the contract against any of the counter-defendants: The counter-
defendants agency relationship with Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC was fully disclosed; 
none of the counter-defendants are properly characterized as third-party beneficiaries; and Idaho 
law does not recognize the version of "inextricably intertwined" estoppel advanced by Boling. 
For these reasons, Boling has failed to prove any theory under ordinary principles of agency or 
contract law that would allow the agreement to be enforced against the non-signatory counter-
defendants and this Court should affirm the decision denying his motion to compel arbitration. 
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1. An arbitration agreement cannot be enforced against an agent against his 
will. 
Black letter law regarding whether a contract can be enforced by or against an agent is 
well settled, simple, and straightforward: 
A person making a contract with another as an agent for a 
disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract. A 
principal is "disclosed" if, at the time of making the contract in 
question, the other party to it has notice that the agent is acting for 
a principal and of the principal's identity. 
* * * 
We conclude, consistent with well established agency principles, 
that an agent by making a contract only on behalf of a disclosed 
principal, whom he was power to bind, does not thereby become 
liable for its non-performance. 
One who makes a contract only on account of 
another ordinarily does not himself contemplate 
responsibility for its performance. His function is 
performed if he causes a contract to be made 
between his principal and the third person. He 
guarantees neither the honesty nor the solvency of 
the principal. 
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, Inc., 96 Idaho 691, 696-697, 535 P.2d 
664, 669-670 (1975) (citations omitted). It is undisputed that each of the counter-defendants' 
relationship with Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC was fully disclosed to Boling at the time 
he entered into the subscription agreement. Because each of the non-signatory counter-
defendants-to the extent they acted as an agent for Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC-acted 
as a disclosed agent the arbitration clause contained within the subscription agreement cannot be 
enforced against them. 
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a. Mutuality of Remedy does not support Boling's request to enforce an 
arbitration clause against a non-signatory counter-defendant. 
Because ordinary principles of agency law do not support Boling's premise, he asks this 
Court to get more creative. He cites authority where a non-signatory agent was entitled to 
enforce an arbitration agreement and then argues that the doctrine of mutuality of remedy 
dictates that if a non-signatory agent can agree to arbitrate a dispute against a signatory, then a 
signatory should also be able to force a non-signatory agent to arbitrate a dispute against his will. 
App. Br. at 30. This argument runs directly counter to the fundamental principal of arbitration 
law, which provides that a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute which he has not 
agreed to arbitrate; Boling has failed to present any authority that supports this proposition. 
Boling's passing reference to mutuality of remedy as a legal basis to compel a 
non-signatory agent into arbitration is not supported by adequate legal authority. }vfarcus & 
Millichap Real Estate Inv. Brokerage Co. v. Hock Inv. Co., the authority upon which Boling 
relies, considers whether both parties to an agreement containing an arbitration clause must be 
bound to the arbitration clause in order for arbitration to be binding. 68 Cal. App. 4th 83, 91 fu. 6 
(1998). Under the facts of Hock, which involved a form real-estate purchase and sales 
agreement, a California court held that both principals to the agreement were required to agree to 
the arbitration clause in order for it to be binding against the principals. Id. Requiring mutuality 
of remedy between the principals is materially different than requiring that a disclosed agent be 
bound by the same agreement(s) that bind the principals. Boling has offered no authority to 
support his invitation to this Court to make that curious leap. 
In an additional effort to support his proposed twist on agency law, Boling presents a 
footnote citation to the cases of Rowe v. Exline, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1276, 1285 (2007) and Harris 
v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 475, 477-79 (1986) for the proposition that "a non-signatory 
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who is the agent can even be compelled to arbitrate against his will." App. Br. at 30 n. l 0. While 
Boling accurately represented Rowe's summation of Harris, Rowe's summation of Harris is 
inaccurate. In Harris the non-signatory doctor was compelled to arbitrate against his will 
because he was found to be a third-party beneficiary of the specific arbitration clause at issue: to 
wit, the arbitration clause specifically "requir[ ed] arbitration of [patients]' claims against 
'employees or other contracting health professional's' of [the medical group]." Harris, 188 Cal. 
App. 3d at 479.1 As additional support for its holding, the Harris Court further noted that the 
intended third-party beneficiary had accepted benefits under the agreement containing the 
arbitration clause. Id. The two facts critical to the Harris decision were (i) that the arbitration 
clause specifically contemplated conferring arbitration as a benefit to an express class of third-
party beneficiaries and (ii) the non-signatory doctor had accepted benefits under that agreement. 
Rowe's suggestion that the non-signatory doctor was compelled to arbitrate against his will 
simply because he was an employee/agent fails to fully appreciate the facts critical to the Harris 
decision. 
Those cases that have considered the logical consequence of mutuality of remedy as a 
basis for compelling arbitration against a non-signatory have squarely rejected the idea. For 
example, In re. Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. 2007), which is the 
authority cited by Boling for the proposition that an arbitration agreement can be enforced by a 
non-signatory agent, has been distinguished on the converse proposition: i.e., a non-signatory 
cannot be compelled to arbitrate against his will. 
Elgohary, nonetheless, cites In re Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 192 
S.W.3d 759, 762 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) and In re Merrill 
Lynch Trust Co., 235 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. 2007) (orig. 
1 Accord Rath v. Managed Health Network, Inc., 123 Idaho 30, 30-31, 844 P.2d 12, 12 (1992) (holding that where 
the arbitration provision specifically applied to only the parties to the agreement, the non-signatory third-party 
beneficiaries could not be forced to arbitrate against their will). 
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proceeding), for the proposition that agents and representatives of 
parties to contracts containing arbitration clauses are also bound to 
arbitrate. However, both Roe and DK Joint Venture distinguished 
these cases, noting that in Roe and A1errill Lynch, the party 
resisting arbitration was, in fact, a signatory to the contract and a 
non-signatory was seeking to compel arbitration. See DK Joint 
Venture, 649 F.3d at 315 (citing Roe, 318 S.W.2d at 520). "In re 
Vesta stands for the proposition that a signatory plaintiff cannot 
avoid its agreement to arbitrate dispute simply by bringing . . . 
claims against the [ nonsignatory] officers, agents, or affiliates of 
the other signatory to the contract." Roe, 318 S.W.2d at 520. Both 
Roe and DK Joint Venture hold that "it matters whether the party 
resisting arbitration is a signatory or not." DK Venture, 649 F.3d at 
317. If the party resisting arbitration is not a signatory to the 
contract, his status as an agent of the signatory entity will not bind 
him to the arbitration provision. Id. 
Elgohary v. Herrera, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 2116, *12-13 (Tex. App. Mar. 5, 2013) (emphasis 
added). The principal advanced by Elgohary is well reasoned and makes good sense. It is fair 
and equitable to require that a signatory arbitrate disputes against a non-signatory disclosed agent 
where the non-signatory disclosed agent has agreed to that forum. The same rationale does not 
apply in the converse. It is not fair and equitable to force a non-signatory disclosed agent into 
arbitration where the non-signatory disclosed agent has not agreed to it. 
Under ordinary agency principals, the signatory's previous agreements by and between 
himself and the principal cannot be superimposed on a disclosed agent. Because a court could 
not re-write the contract to superimpose any other terms of the agreement on the disclosed agent, 
it makes little sense to allow a court to superimpose an arbitration clause on the disclosed agent. 
Arbitration agreements are to be on the same footing as other contracts, but not more so. EEOC 
v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293-94 (2002). 
Because mutuality of remedy does not provide a basis under principals of ordinary 
agency law to enforce an agreement against a non-signatory disclosed agent, this Court should 
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reject Boling's invitation to compel arbitration against the non-signatory counter-defendants on 
such grounds. 
b. Casting his claims as statutory torts does not relieve Boling of first 
showing that the agreement could be enforced against the non-
signatory agents. 
As a final attempt to make his agency theory stick, Boling relies on Sunkist Soft Drinks, 
Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 758 (1 lth Cir. 1993) for the proposition that, because 
his claims against the counter-defendants sound in a statutory tort, he can enforce the arbitration 
agreement against them without first demonstrating that the contract containing the arbitration 
agreement applies to them. App. Br. at 32. On this point, Boling's logic is fundamentally 
flawed as Boling relies on the part of Sunkist which discusses the scope of the arbitration 
provision (which is still good law), and ignores that part of Sunkist that considers whether a 
signatory is equitably estopped from denying a non-signatory's standing to enforce the 
arbitration clause (which was abrogated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Carlisle). 
The part of Sunkist which is arguably relevant to the present appeal is whether Sunkist, a 
signatory, was estopped from contesting counter-defendant/non-signatory Del Monte's efforts to 
enforce the arbitration provision against Sunkist. Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 757. This speaks to the first 
part of the two part inquiry that a court must make when determining whether to compel 
arbitration. Mason, 145 Idaho at 200, 177 P.3d at 947 n. l (two part inquiry involves (i) 
determining whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate and (ii) whether dispute fits within the 
scope of the arbitration clause) (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 
(1995)). Without making clear whether it was relying on ordinary principals of state contract 
law, the Sunkist Court found that non-signatory Del-Monte could enforce the arbitration 
agreement against signatory Sunkist. Id. Because it did not make it clear whether its decision 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 11 
was based on principles of state contract law, this portion of the decision was overruled by the 
Supreme Court of the United States's decision in Arthur Anderson v. Carlisle: 
However, the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Carlisle, which 
postdates all of those decisions of this Court, clarifies that state law 
governs that question, and to the extent any of our earlier decisions 
indicate to the contrary, those indications are overruled or at least 
undermined to the point of abrogation by Carlisle. 
Lawson v. Life of the South Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 1166, 1171 (11th Cir. 2011). Because the issue 
before this Court is whether there is an arbitration agreement that Boling can enforce against the 
non-signatory counter-defendants, the only portion of Sunkist which is even arguably relevant to 
the issue before this Court is no longer good law. 
The portion of Sunkist upon which Boling relies (App. Br. 32) speaks to the second 
question to be answered by a court when deciding whether to compel arbitration: whether the 
dispute at issue falls within the scope of the arbitration clause. Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 757-58 
("Therefore, the focus of our inquiry should be on the nature of the underlying claims asserted by 
Sunkist against Del Monte to determine whether those claims fall within the scope of the 
arbitration clause contained in the license agreement."). This issue would not come before this 
Court unless and until this Court first determined that Boling can compel non-signatory counter-
defendants to arbitration. Accordingly, Boling's reliance on Sunkist is misplaced, logically 
flawed, and should be disregarded by this Court. 
2. Third-party beneficiary law does not provide a basis for compelling the non-
signatory counter-defendants to arbitration. 
a. An arbitration agreement cannot be enforced against an alleged third-
party beneficiary that is not seeking any benefits under the contract. 
In addition to agency theories, Boling also argues that the arbitration agreement should be 
enforced against the non-signatory counter-defendants because they are third-party beneficiaries 
to the agreement containing the arbitration clause. App. Br. at 29 and 33-34. Assuming, for 
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purposes of the present section only, that any of the counter-defendants could properly be 
characterized as third-party beneficiaries of the subscription agreement, the arbitration clause 
still cannot be enforced against them under ordinary principals of contract law because a third-
party beneficiary must comply with the terms of the contract only where that third-party 
beneficiary is attempting to recover benefits due to it under that contract. 
A third-party beneficiary may enforce an arbitration agreement (Comer v. Micor, Inc., 
436 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing E.1 DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone 
PoulencFiber & Resin Intermediates, 269 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2001))), but a third-party 
beneficiary "cannot be bound to a contract it did not sign or otherwise assent to." Id. at 1102 
(emphasis original) (citing Motorsport Eng'g, Inc. v. Maserati SPA, 316 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 
2002) and Abraham Zion Corp. v. Lebow, 761 F.2d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 1985))). A third-party 
beneficiary is found to have "otherwise assented" to an agreement when that third-party 
beneficiary attempts to enforce his rights as a third-party beneficiary under the agreement. Lewis 
v. CEDU Educational Servs., Inc., 135 Idaho 139, 143, 15 P.3d 1147, 1151 (2000); see also Bantz 
v. Bongard, 124 Idaho 780, 785, 864 P.2d 618, 623 (1993) ("noting that an additional insured 
[i.e., third-party beneficiary] must comply with the obligations of a policy in order to benefit 
therefrom"). In this case, none of the counter-defendants are attempting to assert any rights 
arising under the contract that contains the arbitration provision. Because the non-signatory 
counter-defendants are not asserting any rights under the agreement, they have not "otherwise 
assented" to the agreement, and they cannot be bound by such agreement. 
b. Boling has not established any facts that would characterize any of the 
counter-defendants as third-party beneficiaries. 
The reason that the non-signatory counter-defendants are not asserting any rights under 
the agreement is that they are not third-party beneficiaries of the portions of the agreement at 
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issue in this case. Under Idaho law, in order to establish that someone is a third-party 
beneficiary, the at-issue provision in the agreement must expressly reflect the intent to benefit 
the third-party. Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 687, 183 P.3d 771, 775 (2008). "The third-
party must show the contract was made primarily for his benefit; it is not sufficient that the third-
party is a mere incidental beneficiary to the contract." Id. (citations omitted). "The intent to 
benefit the third-party must be expressed in the contract itself." Id. (citations omitted). An 
"indirect reference to a third-party does not make the third-party a beneficiary of the [contract]." 
Rajagopalan v. Noteworld, LLC, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10055, *7 (9th Cir. May 20, 2013) 
(quoting Tooley v. Stevenson Co-Ply, Inc., 106 Wn.2d 626, 724 P.2d 368, 371 (Wash. 1986) 
(applying Washington law regarding third-party beneficiaries)). 
An express reference to a third-party beneficiary was found in the case of Harris v. 
Superior Court, where the at-issue arbitration provision expressly identified employees as third-
party beneficiaries in that the arbitration clause specifically "requir[ed] arbitration of [patients]' 
claims against 'employees or other contracting health professional' s' of [the medical group]." 
Harris, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 479.2 There is nothing so bold in the arbitration provision before this 
Court today. Rather, the arbitration provision that Boling seeks to enforce against the non-
signatory counter-defendants does not make any direct or indirect reference to third-party 
beneficiaries. Accordingly, the non-signatory counter-defendants are not properly characterized 
as third-party beneficiaries of the agreement. 
Boling's claims that the counter-defendants are third-party beneficiaries to the contract 
rest on the same factual allegations that make them agents of the Clearwater 2008 Note Program, 
LLC: i.e., indirect references that describe how the funds raised by Clearwater 2008 Note 
2 Accord Rath v. Managed Health Network, Inc., 123 Idaho 30, 30-31, 844 P.2d 12, 12 (1992) (holding that where 
the arbitration provision specifically referenced the parties to the agreement, non-signatory third-party beneficiary 
could not be forced to arbitrate agaL11st her will). 
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Program, LLC will be managed and used. Specifically, Boling cites to a provision of the PPM 
which establishes that certain persons and entities are paid: "The Company, the Manager and 
their Affiliates are entitled to receive certain significant fees and other significant compensation, 
payments, and reimbursements from the sale of the Notes." App. Br. at 33 n.13. Boling has not 
claimed that he invested in the Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC with the specific intent of 
providing benefits to the counter-defendants.Boling has not cited any authority for the 
proposition that receiving management fees, salaries, or other reimbursements gives rise to third-
party beneficiary status. 
Boling also cites to the PPM which states that "Most, if not all, of the loans to be made 
by the Company with the proceeds of this Offering will be made to Affiliates of the Company 
and the Manager." App. Br. at 33 n.13. Boling has not claimed that he made the investment with 
the intent to provide this type of benefit to the counter-defendants. Boling has not provided any 
authority for the proposition that the recipient of loans made by the Clearwater 2008 Note 
Program, LLC gives rise to third-party beneficiary status. Boling has also not provided any 
evidence that any of the non-signatory counter-defendants ever received loans made by the 
Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC. Under Idaho law, the theoretic possibility that one or 
more of the counter-defendants could have applied for and been given a loan from the 
Clearwater 2008 Note Program, LLC is insufficient to establish third-party beneficiary status. 
As a final attempt to establish third-party beneficiary status, Boling notes that 
counter-defendant RE Capital, LLC (which is currently in bankruptcy) is the guarantor of the 
Notes. From that, Boling argues that RE Capital, LLC's members, counter-defendants Meyer 
and Benak, are third-party beneficiaries. Boling cites no authority to support the proposition that 
the guarantor of a Note is a third-party beneficiary of that Note, nor has he cited any authority for 
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the more novel proposition that the owner/managers of a bankrupt guarantor are third-party 
beneficiaries of the underlying obligation. 
In sum, Boling has failed to establish that any of the counter-defendants were third-party 
beneficiaries of the agreement. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Court's order 
denying Boling's motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that none of the non-signatory 
counter-defendants are third-party beneficiaries. 
3. Ordinary principles of contract law do not support the inextricably 
intertwined version of equitable estoppel advanced by Boling. 
Boling's third basis for attempting to compel the non-signatory counter-defendants to 
arbitration is that "counterdefendants' actionable conduct is inextricably interwoven with the 
formation and performance of the entire agreement, making it equitable to compel the non-
signatory Counter defendants to also be bound by the arbitration clause in the entire agreement." 
App. Br. at 29. Under ordinary principals of contract law, this is not a basis for enforcing a 
contract against a non-signatory to that contract. Rather, this loosely defined and seldom used 
theory grew up around the development of a "federal substantive law" of arbitration which was 
rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Arthur Anderson v. Carlisle. 
Before it was rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States, the ill-defined concept 
of "inextricably interwoven" conduct giving rise to enforcing an arbitration agreement against a 
non-signatory counter-defendant was unsettled and met with healthy skepticism: 
While the Fifth Circuit has recognized concerted-misconduct 
estoppel, the theory is far from well-settled in the federal courts. 
Despite hundreds of federal appeals involving arbitration, it 
appears in only 10 reported opinions. In the two leading cases, 
Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C. and MS Dealer Service 
Corp. V Franklin, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits held that both 
direct-benefits and concerted-misconduct estoppel were present, so 
it is unclear what the latter theory added to the result. Of the 
remainder, the theory was found inapplicable in 4 and it was not 
reached in 2 more. In only 2 cases did the result hinge on the 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 16 
exception-and in those the Firth Circuit compelled arbitration in 
one and refused to do so in the other. 
In Re. Merrill Lynch Trust Co., 235 S.W.3d at 192-93 (original emphasis omitted). The Texas 
court went on to note "Until the United States Supreme Court clarifies whether concerted-
misconduct estoppel correctly reflects federal law, or even whether federal or state law governs 
the issue, today's decision must remain somewhat tentative." Id. at 195. In Carlisle, the 
Supreme Court of the United States spoke on the issue and held that there is no federal 
substantive law of arbitration and state contract law provides the correct rules of decision. 
Carlisle, 556 U.S. at 631-32. 
At the district court, the non-signatory counter-defendants set forth the elements of 
equitable estoppel, as it applies under Idaho contract law, in support of their argument that they 
cannot be compelled to arbitrate against their will. R.000552. Anticipating that argument on this 
appeal, Boling argues that a different version of equitable estoppel applies when an arbitration 
clause is at issue. App. Br. at 38. In support of Boling's request to use an arbitration specific 
version of equitable estoppel, he claims that "In the context of Idaho arbitration law, equitable 
estoppel 'precludes a party from claiming the benefits of a contract while simultaneously 
attempting to avoid the burdens that contract imposes."' App. Br. at 38 (citing General 
Conference of the Evangelical Methodist Church v. New Heart Community Fellowship, Inc., 
2012 WL 2916013 at *5 (D. Idaho 2012)). Boling failed to apprise this Court of the source of 
the authority upon which the Federal District Court relied in that opinion. Had he done so, this 
Court would have been advised that the Federal District Court did not rely on Idaho law, but 
rather relied on 5th Circuit law which was abrogated in Carlisle. 
The following line of authority that Boling failed to explain or distinguish demonstrates 
that the state law rules of decision, which were advanced by counter-defendants at the district 
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court, is the proper framework pursuant to which this Court should consider Boling's equitable 
estoppel claims. The New Heart case cited by Boling was quoting Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436, 
F .3d l 098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) which, in turn, relied on a quote from Wash. Mut. Fin. Group. 
LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 267 (5th Cir. 2004). The opinion in Bailey made it clear that at the 
time of the decision the Fifth Circuit was using federal substantive law of arbitration for its rules 
of decision. Id. 267-68 and n.6. 
Following the Carlisle decision, courts within the Fifth Circuit recognized that any 
federal substantive law of arbitration had been abrogated. THI of NM at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. 
Patton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5252 at *17-*21 (D.N.M. January 3, 2012). Noting that 
"equitable estoppel" had to mean the same thing in the arbitration context as other contexts, the 
Hobbs Court applied New Mexico law regarding equitable estoppel as it applies in the contract 
setting. Id. at *29 (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) ("A court may not, 
then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that 
agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration 
agreements under state law."). After expressly noting that state law provided the appropriate 
rules of decision, the Hobbs court quoted and used New Mexico's 3-part version of equitable 
estoppel. Id. at *30 ("(1) the party to be estopped made a misleading representation by conduct; 
(2) the party claiming estoppel had an honest and reasonable belief based on that conduct that the 
party to be estopped would not assert a certain right under the contract or a defense thereto; and 
(3) the party claiming estoppel acted in reliance on the conduct to its determent or prejudice.") 
This version of equitable estoppel is substantially similar to that used in Idaho, which was 
the version cited by counter-defendants at the district court. Boling has not provided any 
authority tending to demonstrate that Idaho law has ever adopted or applied the version of 
equitable estopple upon which he asks this Court to decide this case. And, because it is improper 
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to construe an arbitration agreement differently than a non-arbitration agreement, (see Perry, 482 
U.S. at 492 n. 9), counter-defendants respectfully request that the version of equitable estoppel 
applicable to contracts in general be applied in this case. 
Boling cannot establish, under Idaho's version of equitable estoppel, that the arbitration 
clause (or any other provision of the contract) can be enforced against the non-signatory 
counter-defendants. In order to enforce a contract on the grounds of equitable estoppel, the party 
claiming estoppel generally must show 
[ l] a false representation or concealment of a material fact be made 
with actual or constructive knowledge of the true state of facts; 
[2] that the party to whom the false representation was made was 
without knowledge or the means of acquiring knowledge of the real 
facts; [3] that the false representation was made with the intent that 
it be acted upon; and [ 4] that the party to whom it was made relied 
on and acted upon it to his prejudice. 
Idaho Title Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 465, 468, 531 P.2d 227, 230 (1975) 
(quoting Bjornstad v. Perry, 92 Idaho 402, 405, 443 P.2d 999, 1002 (1968)) (brackets added). 
"All of the above factors are of equal importance and there can be no estoppel absent any of the 
elements." Id. (citing Sullivan v. Mabey, 45 Idaho 595, 264 P. 233 (1928) and Alder v. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 92 Idaho 506, 446 P.2d 628 (1968)). Boling has failed to present a cogent 
argument applying Idaho law of equitable estoppel to the facts that he claims entitle him to 
enforce the arbitration provision against the non-signatory counter defendants. Rather, Boling 
relies on his allegations of the "incestuous operation of the individual corporate officers and their 
web of interlocking business entities under the umbrella of the 'Clearwater' name" (App. Br. At 
34) and an "inextricably intertwined" version of estoppel that developed under the federal 
substantive law of arbitration (App. Br. At 29 and 38)-a body of law that has been rejected by 
the Supreme Court of the United States. 
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At the district court, counter-defendants argued that Boling could not satisfy the 
requirements of Idaho's equitable estoppel law. The district court agreed. On this appeal, 
Boling makes no effort to satisfy the requirements of Idaho's equitable estoppel law but, 
instead-and in the face of very clear, contrary authority from the Supreme Court of the United 
States, which authority has been recognized by several federal courts in overruling and/or 
abrogating prior decisions that follow a body of arbitration specific contract law-Boling argues 
only that ordinary principals of contract law do not apply and that special rules applicable only in 
arbitration should be considered. App. Br. at 38. Boling's argument and legal authority miss the 
mark and Boling has not provided to this Court any bases upon which it should reverse the 
district court's decision. 
4. The presumption in favor of arbitration does not apply when determining 
whether a party has agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration. 
Boling appears to acknowledge that, in order to compel the non-signatory counter-
defendants into arbitration, he must establish the grounds to do so under ordinary principals of 
contract or agency law. Because Boling is unable to do so, he asserts that any doubts regarding 
the scope of an arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of arbitration. App. Br. 25-26. 
However, the presumption in favor of arbitration applies only to the scope of an arbitration 
agreement; it does not apply to the determination of whether an agreement can be enforced 
against a non-signatory. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 293-94 n.9 (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. 
Bd. of Trustees of Leland Standford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
The strong public policy in favor of arbitration does not extend to 
those who are not parties to an arbitration agreement, and a party 
cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute that he has not agreed to 
resolve by arbitration. 
Westera, 129 Cal. App. 4th at 763 (quoting Buckner v. Tamarin, 98 Cal. App. 4th 140, 142 
(citing Benasra v. Marciano, 92 Cal. App. 4th 987, 990 (2001)). Boling has failed to establish, 
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under ordinary agency or contract principals, that the contract can be enforced against the non-
signatory counter-defendants. Because this is the threshold question of arbitrability, the 
presumption in favor of arbitration does not apply and this court should not "resolve any doubts" 
in favor of compelling these non-signatory defendants to arbitration. 
B. Boling has waived his right and is otherwise judicially estopped from attempting to 
compel arbitration. 
Even if Boling could have established a right to compel the non-signatory counter-
defendants to arbitration, he waived that right by making representations to the district court that 
judicially estop him from asserting that right. "A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. It is a voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense with something of 
value or to forego some right or advantage which he might at his option have demanded and 
insisted upon." Motor Carrier Operations v. IDAHO PUC, 83 Idaho 351, 357, 364 P.2d 167, 
171 (1961) (quoting Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 304 P.2d 646, 649 (1956)). "Judicial 
estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position, then subsequently seeking a 
second position that is incompatible with the first." Hoagland v. Ada County, 2013 Ida. LEXIS 
154, *27 (Idaho May 16, 2013) (citing Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 94, 277 P.2d 561, 565 
(1954)). "The policy behind judicial estoppel is to protect 'the integrity of the judicial system, 
by protecting the orderly administration of justice a.11d having regard for the dignity of the 
judicial proceeding.'" Id. (citing A & J Constr. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 685, 116 P.3d 12, 16 
(2005)). "It is intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the legal system." Id. 
(also citing 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver §186 (2012)). 
In this matter, Boling has taken impermissibly inconsistent positions with the judicial 
system. At the time counter-defendants filed their petition to stay the arbitration, Boling 
responded by filing substantive counterclaims. R.000026-000223. Counter-defendants objected 
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to the substantive counterclaims on the grounds that they were improperly brought in response to 
a petition to stay the arbitration. R.000002. In his opposition to the petition to stay arbitration, 
Boling made the following representation to the District Court: 
If the Court allows Boling's counterclaims to be prosecuted in this 
lawsuit, which all Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have been served 
with the counterclaims and discovery is pending, then Defendant 
Boling accepts Plaintiffs' objection to arbitrate and decision not to 
arbitrate claims against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants. Judicial 
intervention in this lawsuit is Boling's preferred method to resolve 
his ICP A claims because 1) it allows Boling the right to judicial 
discovery of information exclusively in Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants' possession, which is denied by arbitration, 2) none of 
the proposed arbitrators have any experience in handling unique 
ICPA claims or issues, and 3) for judicial economy, the 
prosecution of the counterclaims is significantly advanced at this 
time. 
R.000253 (original emphasis omitted) (emphasis added). Boling re-iterated this position in the 
conclusion: "Additionally, if the Court allows Boling's counterclaims to be prosecuted in this 
lawsuit, which all Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have been served with the counterclaims and 
discovery is pending, Boling, as the prevailing party, accepts Plaintiffs' objection to arbitrate and 
decision not to arbitrate claims against Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants." R000260 (emphasis 
omitted). The district court granted counter-claimants motion to stay arbitration and allowed 
Boling to pursue his counter-claims. R.000278-279. Because Boling expressly waived his 
right to seek to compel arbitration if he was allowed to proceed with his counterclaims in the 
district court, and because Boling gained the advantage of substantial discovery which, by 
Boling's own admissions, would not have been available to him in arbitration, Boling should be 
judicially estopped from taking a different, inconsistent position. Accordingly, counter-
defendants respectfully request that this Court find that Boling is judicially estopped from 
seeking to compel arbitration against them. 
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C. Counter-defendants are entitled to attorney's fees on this appeal. 
The counter-defendants respectfully request attorney's fees under Idaho Code section 12-
121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41, for their defense of Boling's frivolous appeal. Idaho Code 
section 12-121 "permits an award of attorney fees in a civil action to the prevailing party if the 
court determines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation." Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237, 245, 280 P.3d 740, 748 (2012) (citing 
Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 292-93, 127 P.3d 187, 195-96 (2005)). An appeal is 
deemed to be frivolous when arguments are '"unsupported by any authority" or "contrary to prior 
decisions rendered by this Court." Grazer v. Jones, 294 P .3d 184, 197 (Idaho 2013 ). Attorney's 
fees on appeal are proper when "the law is well settled and the appellant fails to make a showing 
that the trial court misapplied the law." Navarrete v. City of Caldwell, 130 Idaho 849, 852, 949 
P.2d 597, 600 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1018, 829 P.2d 1361, 
1367 (Ct. App. 1991). "Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as litigants 
represented by an attorney and this Court has previously awarded attorney fees against a pro se 
litigant that pursued an appeal frivolously." Rizzo v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2013 Ida. LEXIS 159, 
*27 (Idaho May 22, 2013) (citing Twin Falls Cnty, v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d 1043, 
1046 (2003). 
Boling's motion to compel arbitration and continued pursuit of that motion on appeal are 
frivolous because Boling expressly represented to the district court he preferred to resolve this 
dispute in the judicial forum and, further, that if he was allowed to pursue his substantive 
counterclaims in the district court, he would consent to counter-defendant's objection to 
arbitration. He was granted the requested relief, substantially invoked the litigation machinery, 
and then took a fundamentally inconsistent position. The district court then denied his motion to 
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compel on the merits and in light of well settled authority out of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
Rather than arguing a basis for distinguishing the authority of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, Boling argued that such authority did not apply and supported his argument with 
authority out of the Federal District Court, in and for the District of Idaho, which relied on 
precedent from the Fifth Circuit that had been overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in 
Carlisle. Instead of fairly facing this adverse authority, Boling failed to even apprise this Court 
of the source of the authority upon which he was relying by omitting the relevant citations. 
Boling's appeal has been brought frivolously and the counter-defendants are entitled to 
an award of attorney's fees for having to defend against the frivolous and unsupported appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, counter-defendants respectfully request that this Court affirm 
the decision of the district court granting their motion to stay arbitration and denying Boling's 
motion to compel arbitration, and award counter-defendants their reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred in defending against this appeal. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 2013. 
RAINEY LAW OFFICE 
~~z~ 
Attorneys Respondents 
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